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226 Abstract
This paper argues that none of the secular trends that have driven down real inter-
est rates over the past decades is likely to reverse in the near future. Government 
debt-servicing costs have therefore decreased significantly and can be expected to 
decrease further over the coming years. We calculate the direct gains accruing to 
the Belgian government from lower net debt interest payments and contrast them 
to the projected future increases in age-related expenditures. If interest rates 
remain on their current levels and savings on interest payments are channelled to 
cover the increases in age-related expenditures, they will cover two thirds of 
financing needs in these areas until 2030.
Keywords: interest rates, ageing, government debt management, risk
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the key stylised facts of advanced economies over the last three to four 
decades has been the persistent decrease in real interest rates. A related, parallel 
and intertwined development is the decline in the policy rate of central banks.
A number of negative effects stemming from the decline in these interest rates 
have been at the centre of monetary and financial policy debates in recent years. 
For central banks, the issue of the zero lower bound – i.e. how to conduct mone-
tary policy when policy rates are at or just above zero – has been the central policy 
question. Pension funds and life insurers, which have traditionally relied on long-
dated government bonds to finance liabilities, are finding themselves particularly 
challenged in meeting past commitments of financial return. Asset bubbles, in 
particular in the housing market, may further increase contingent liabilities of 
governments across the globe.
We argue in this paper, however, that this preoccupation is one-sided. Another key 
consequence of falling interest rates is the reduction in the servicing costs of large 
sovereign debt burdens. With a focus on Belgium, we show that the favourable 
re-financing environment has benefitted public finances in several ways. Like 
other heavily indebted countries, Belgium has managed to save significantly on 
debt-servicing costs. In addition, there is an on-going process of decreasing gov-
ernment debt in real terms and the government has managed to make its debt 
maturity profile less vulnerable to interest rate shocks.
On the other hand, the main future challenge to public finances in developed coun-
tries is the rising pressure stemming from their ageing societies. In some Euro-
pean countries, the increased expenditure is projected to amount to up to 7% of 
GDP by 2060 (European Commission, 2015). For Belgium, the situation is less 
dire. After the pension reform in 2015, which reduced the projected increase in 
pension expenditures by 2 percentage points by 2030, Belgium now faces an addi-
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227While government windfalls from lower interest rates are clearly not linked to any 
one specific expenditure item (i.e. expenditures related to an ageing population), 
in this case it is sensible to consider the two together. Both the downward move-
ment in interest rates and the increase in pension and health-related expenditures 
are to some extent driven by demographic changes and societal ageing. Thus, if 
one (partly) offsets the other, this should be taken into account when addressing 
the public finance challenges of an ageing population.
In this study, we first review recent contributions to the debate on persistently low 
real interest rates and conclude that none of the trends that led to a decrease in 
risk-free interest rates can be expected to be reversed in the near future. We then 
relate the two diametrical trends, decreasing debt-servicing costs and the rise in 
age-related expenditure, and argue that, after the recent pension reform, the sav-
ings on the former offset around two thirds of the increase in the latter. Our projec-
tions, based on current secondary market yields on Belgian government bonds, 
show a further decrease in net debt interest payments by 1.6 percentage points of 
GDP between 2013 and 2030. Even in a hypothetical scenario in which interest 
rates rise moderately, the savings on debt-servicing costs would cover more than 
half of the additional public expenditure.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second and third sections 
provide the theoretical and empirical background for the fall in real interest rates 
across developed countries. It makes an effort to reconcile the results from diverse 
recent contributions, which range from overlapping generation models to growth 
accounting, and argues that a reversal of the strongest secular trends driving down 
real interest is not imminent or even likely. In the fourth section, the focus turns to 
Belgium and the direct impact of persistently low interest rates on its public 
finances. Section five concludes.
2 SAVINGS, INVESTMENT AND THE REAL RATE OF INTEREST
It is useful to start by breaking down the factors determining the real interest rate 
into a simple supply and demand problem. If supply, i.e. the propensity to save, 
increases, this puts a downward pressure on interest rates. Similarly, if demand, 
i.e. the propensity to invest, decreases, interest rates are expected to decline. Fig-
ure 1 (left hand side) shows a hypothetical scenario where the propensity to invest 
declines (i.e. an inward shift) and the propensity to save rises (i.e. an outward 
shift) such that the equilibrium volume of savings and investment as a share of 
GDP remains unchanged. This is in line with observed savings and investment 
(figure 1, right hand side): the amount of global savings and investment relative to 
GDP has remained approximately constant over the past three decades. A small 
increase can be observed between 2002 and 2007 and a new stable relative vol-
ume thereafter, interrupted only by a slump and a quick resurgence during the 
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228 Figure 1
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Note: EU-7 real interest rate is the unweighted average of long-term real interest rates in Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Countries were selected based 
on long-term data availability.
Source: authors’ own configuration based on Bean et al. (2015, left); AMECO and IMF WEO 
(right).
Determining the shape of the investments/savings schedules and the concomitant 
move in the interest rate is a classic economic identification problem. Hence, the 
sensitivity of both savings and investment to changes in the interest rate has been 
analysed in a number of empirical studies with the most recent calculations by the 
IMF (2014a) showing the elasticity of investment to the real interest rate to be 
about -0.5, and an elasticity of saving to the real rate of about 0.15. 
Although even extreme cases, i.e. a complete insensitivity of either desired invest-
ment or desired savings, cannot be ruled out, as noted by Bean et al. (2015), it is 
likely that the observed decline in real interest rates combined with unchanged 
relative volume is due to a shift in both the investment and savings schedules. 
Given the uncertainties related to the shape of the investment and savings sched-
ules and the observed trend in the real interest rate, recent contributions have 
focused on analysing secular trends that coincide with the decline in the real inter-
est rate and affect either the savings and/or the investment schedule. Bean et al. 
(2015:21) argue that “while we cannot rely on the evolution of the global savings/
investment share to identify the drivers of the decline in interest rates, we can still 
look directly at the correlation between those drivers and the movements in inter-
est rates”. While such a narrative approach will not establish causal links, with the 
aid of structural models of drivers of investment and savings, we should nonethe-
less be able to infer the direction of the effects (see Eggertson, Mehrotra and Rob-
bins, 2017; and Rachel and Smith, 2015 for recent examples).1 Our ambition here 
1 Borio et al. (2017) point out two technical issues with such a structural modeling approach: first, the under-
lying theoretical models rest on untested assumptions. Second, empirical models tend to be overidentified, 
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229is therefore not to quantify these drivers in a growth accounting framework, but 
rather to assess to what extent secular trends that have been considered important 
drivers of global real interest rates in the recent literature can be expected to be 
reversed.
Our discussion of these interest rate drivers in section three is naturally based on 
what is often referred to as the risk-free long-term advanced country interest rate, 
commonly measured by 10-year sovereign bond yields adjusted by inflation 
expectations to convert nominal into real rates.2 Projections of savings on govern-
ment debt servicing cost in Belgium in section four are calculated based on nomi-
nal interest rates, under the implicit assumption of a constant inflation (expecta-
tion) rate over the relevant time period.3
3  SECULAR DRIVERS OF SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT AND THE ROLE  
OF MONETARY POLICY
In this section, we first briefly review the secular drivers that have been increasing 
desired savings and decreasing desired investment and qualitatively assess the 
likelihood of trend reversals in these variables, closely building on Rachel and 
Smith (2016). We then provide a brief discussion of the potential role of monetary 
regimes in determining real interest rates. 
3.1 DESIRED SAVINGS
3.1.1 DEMOGRAPHICS
Analyses of the effect of ageing on the real interest are based on the life-cycle 
model of consumption and savings (Brumberg and Modigliani, 1954). Individual 
saving takes place when people are in their high-earning years, typically starting 
in their late 30s until they reach retirement age. Börsch-Supan (2003) has con-
ducted the most comprehensive empirical study on six advanced countries – the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Japan – 
and their results indeed show the above-described hump shape for most countries. 
Moreover, the author shows that there is little dissaving at older ages, a trend 
exacerbated by a rise in retirement age in many developed countries. The rela-
tively recent trend of longer working lives adds additional uncertainty because it 
prolongs the prime savings years. Carvalho, Ferrero and Nechio (2016) stress that 
an increase in life expectancy heightens the propensity to save among the middle-
aged cohort, as a prolonged retirement period is anticipated. 
2 A simple way to measure inflation expectations is to calculate the spread between yields of inflation-linked 
bonds and bond yields of the same maturity. A more precise theoretical concept is that of the equilibrium real 
interest rate; the real interest rate where real GDP equals potential GDP, i.e. where the output gap is zero and 
where the inflation rate is at the level of the target inflation rate. This unobserved interest rate has received 
much attention in recent literature and several authors have suggested models for estimating it (Justiniano 
and Primiceri, 2010; Barsky, Justiniano and Melosi, 2014; Cúrdia et al., 2015; Kiley, 2015; Laubach and Wil-
liams, 2015; Lubik and Matthes, 2015). See also Taylor and Wieland (2016) for a discussion on the shortcom-
ings of these model-based approaches,
3 In Belgium, inflation, as measured by changes in the consumer price index (CPI), has remained remarka-
bly constant over the past decades (see figure A1 in the appendix I). Currently, all Belgian government bonds 
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230 At the same time, a slowdown in population growth has an ambiguous effect on 
the real interest rate: while the increase in capital per worker puts downward pres-
sure on interest rates, an increasing number of retirees with a lower propensity to 
save might well offset this effect in the long run.
Overall, while global demographic forces may be slowly reversed over the com-
ing decade, both the increase in longevity and retirement age are likely to dampen 
the reversal sufficiently to postpone the effect beyond the 2030 time horizon rel-
evant to this study (Rachel and Smith, 2015). 
3.1.2 WITHIN-COUNTRY INCOME INEQUALITY 
While inequality among countries has fallen, within-country inequality has risen 
overall in recent decades. This observation has most remarkably been brought to 
the surface of the debate by Piketty (2014). He provides evidence for a rising 
share of income held by the top decile of the population for a number of advanced 
and emerging economies. 
While within-country inequality has indeed risen among OECD countries on 
average, detailed studies on the effect of rising inequality on savings are only 
available for the US (see Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004; Saez and Zucamn, 
2014) where the effect is more pronounced than in other OECD countries, as 
shown in figure 2. 
Regardless of the causal effect of within-country inequality on global real interest 
rates, there appears to be no evidence of a trend reversal in the short to medium 
term.
Figure 2
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2313.1.3.  SAVINGS IN EMERGING MARKETS AND CHINESE FINANCIAL  
MARKET INTEGRATION
After 2000, savings in emerging markets relative to GDP have increased signifi-
cantly, after being roughly constant in the preceding two decades. The IMF 
(2014a) notes that global savings rates went up by 1.7 percentage points between 
2000 and 2007, 1.5 percentage points of which were due to higher emerging mar-
ket savings, 0.8 percentage points to the higher share of emerging markets in 
global GDP and a 0.6 percentage point decline to lower relative savings rates in 
advanced economies.
While foreign exchange accumulation in the aftermath of the 1997-98 crisis in the 
whole of Asia has certainly contributed to higher demand for safe advanced-econ-
omy assets, Bean et al. (2015) stress that China in particular has been a drag on 
global interest rates. The combination of a rise in savings and large current account 
surpluses caused by China’s export-led growth model resulted in an extensive 
outflow of funds. These went mainly into advanced economies where they pushed 
down real interest rates, enabled by Chinese financial market integration. Many 
underlying drivers for high net savings rates, which are deeply rooted in the 
household, the firm and the government sector, have been cited (Tao Yang, 2012). 
Ma and Yi (2010), for example, identify corporate restructuring, the Lewis model 
of transformation and rapid ageing as the main driving forces. In the medium 
term, these forces will reach a plateau and slightly reverse (Ma and Tao Yang, 
2013). This trajectory is in line with IMF forecasts that predict a decline in both 
Chinese gross national savings and a more moderate current account. In the same 
vein, Chinese foreign exchange reserves dropped sharply between the end of 2014 
and early 2016, but the latest numbers show that this trend is already faltering, 
albeit not reversing (IMF, 2016a).
3.2 DESIRED INVESTMENT
3.2.1  RISE IN THE SPREAD BETWEEN THE RISK-FREE RATE AND THE COST  
OF CAPITAL 
There appears to be a clear shift of preference among investors, towards safe 
assets.4 The aggregate equity risk premium, defined by the cost of equity minus 
the risk-free rate, has increased globally between 2000 and 2016 with the excep-
tion of emerging market economies where it has fluctuated around a constant level 
since 2000 (Credit Suisse, 2016). 
The reason this trend has important implications for global real interest rates is its 
impact on companies’ investment decisions. Investment decisions depend on the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC), the weighted average of a company’s 
debt servicing costs and its cost of equity. With the equity risk premium shooting 
up, these costs increased vis-à-vis the risk-free rate, making corporate investment 
relatively less attractive. As Rachel and Smith (2015) note, predicting the future 



































































43 (3) 225-246 (2019)
232 of the equity premium is difficult, but the post-crisis regulatory landscape does not 
favour a trend in either direction. 
3.2.2 RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL GOODS
Cheaper capital may have two effects on investment: first, it may trigger more 
investment as lower marginal returns are needed to recoup the price of capital, and 
second, a given amount of investment can be maintained by dedicating a relatively 
smaller share of overall production to capital-intensive projects. As illustrated 
convincingly by Rachel and Smith (2015), the 30% decline in the relative price of 
capital goods from the 1980s had an overall negative effect on investment, as the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital was not sufficiently high to 
contain the effect (see also Thwaites, 2015). 
3.2.3 REDUCED PROFITABILITY OF INVESTMENT
The above decline in the relative price of investment was predominant until the 
early 2000s. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a different force took 
over: a drop in investment profitability. A study by the IMF (2014a) shows empir-
ically that between 1980 and 2013, both total factor productivity and the expected 
investment profitability declined substantially.5
The study points to the conclusion that, in the near to medium term, there are no 
signs of increasing investment profitability, absent substantial structural reforms.
3.2.4 PUBLIC INVESTMENT DECLINE IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES
Public investment in advanced economies has been on a declining path since the 
1980s, putting a downward pressure on real interest rates (IMF, 2014b). Recent 
declines are partly explained by the downward pressure on total public expendi-
tures in many countries after the 2008 financial crisis. However, Jäger and Schmidt 
(2016) suggest that the long-run trend is a structural feature of an ageing society. 
They predict that the trend will only reverse once the share of older people in the 
electorate reverses. Analyses by the IMF (2016b) confirm this view and do not 
predict a reversal of the trend in the near future.
In conclusion, while linking secular trends to the decline in the propensity to 
invest seems evident, explaining the rise in the propensity to save is more difficult. 
While emerging market reserve accumulation and structural phenomena in China 
have certainly contributed to lower real interest rates in advanced economies, 
other secular trends such as the rise in within-country inequality and the link 
between ageing and desired savings, albeit widely accepted, are difficult to estab-
lish empirically. The conclusion we draw is that while we cannot quantify the 
5 See IMF (2014a:19) for details on the empirical specification estimated. Essentially, the authors regress real 
private investment on a measure of lagged real GDP. They then analyse the structure of the forecast error 
under the hypothesis that it is negative if real investment declined more than what can be predicted by the 
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233importance of the different secular drivers of low real interest rates, we consider it 
unlikely that any of the causative factors will reverse any time soon.
3.3 MONETARY POLICY
The above qualitative review of the structural determinants of savings and invest-
ment implicitly assumes long-run neutrality of monetary policy. This view has 
been challenged, most prominently in a recent contribution by Borio et al. (2017), 
who argue that “interest rates necessarily reflect the interplay between the central 
bank’s reaction function and private-sector beliefs and behaviour” (p. 22). 
Empirically, their criticism of the structural explanations deduced by proponents of 
the savings-investment narrative is based on the observation that the decline in real 
interest rates across the globe also coincided with a change in monetary policy 
regimes from post-Bretton Woods to an explicit inflation/price stability targeting.
For our research question at hand, two points are important to mention with 
respect to these findings. First, disentangling a potentially endogenous monetary 
policy regime change from structural economic factors is impossible for a number 
of econometric reasons.6 Second, it is unlikely that advanced-country monetary 
regimes will change over the relevant time horizon until 2030. 
An issue more relevant to short- and medium-term changes in advanced country 
real interest rates is the unconventional monetary policies recently carried out by 
major central banks. Quantitative easing (QE) programmes in Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the euro area have certainly had a negative effect 
on long-term government bond yields.7 Although there is an ongoing discussion of 
the effectiveness of the different (short term) transmission channels of QE (see 
Alcidi et al., 2015), the general phenomenon of low interest rates have not been 
reversed after the end of the first generation of the ECB’s QE programme; conceiv-
ably because structural factors driving longer term interest rates are unchanged.8
6 Boeri et al. (2017) attempt to tackle this issue by analyzing long-term data over more than a century and 
including both monetary regime change dummies as well as variables that capture savings and investment 
drivers in an empirical specification. They then proceed to argue that variation in country-specific real inter-
est rates is mostly explained by the regime-change dummies. However, this approach is econometrically dif-
ficult: since all trends coincide, the regime change dummies are essentially country-specific era fixed effects. 
In such a specification, the investment and saving proxy variables are estimated based on the variation left 
around the mean within these country-by-era fixed effects. This could still be informative if there was het-
erogeneity across countries in monetary regime changes which do not coincide with trends in relevant struc-
tural parameters; however, there is very little of such heterogeneity in advanced countries (see table 9, p. 27 
in Boeri et al., 2017). A further issue with including savings and investment drivers as independent variables 
simultaneously is the multi-collinearity between these variables. Some of them, such as GDP growth, popula-
tion growth and life expectancy are by definition highly correlated, which will both affect point estimates (in 
an a priori unknown manner) and increase the standard errors around these estimates. 
7 See for example Breedon, Chadha and Waters (2012), who find that the Bank of England’s QE1 lowered 
government bond yields by 50 to 100 basis points.
8 The ECB’s President, Mario Draghi, summed up the situation well in a recent speech: “[raising real interest 
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234 4  THE EFFECT OF PERSISTENTLY LOW INTEREST RATES  
ON PUBLIC FINANCES: THE CASE OF BELGIUM
In this section, we first discuss and calculate the potential for Belgium to save on 
net debt interest payments. We then contrast these potential savings with projected 
additional age-related expenditure. 
4.1 SAVINGS ON NET DEBT INTEREST PAYMENTS IN BELGIUM
The falling interest rates have led to lower government net debt interest payments 
throughout European countries. Most of the gains have already been realised over 
the past decade. Table 1 below shows the current interest payments of selected 
European governments (column 2) and contrasts them with current 10-year bench-
mark yields (column 3) to indicate additional savings potential.
Table 1
































France 1.7 1.07  7.2  87.5 47.3
Germany 0.8 0.26  5.8  44.5 47.7
UK 2.2 1.20 14.9  77.5 n/a
Italy 3.6 2.21  6.8 119.0 29.4
Belgium 2.3 0.82  8.7  90.1 52.7 
Portugal 3.7 3.92  6.5 110.1 52.1
Data sources: OECD Economic Outlook 2016, Bloomberg, ECB, IMF WEO 2017 and Eurostat 
for columns from left to right.
The current average residual maturity (column 4) gives an additional indication of 
the cost-saving potential: the low interest rate environment makes it cheaper to 
de-risk the maturity profile of government debt. Governments that have issued 
debt with a longer average maturity have therefore more potential to save on the 
issuance of future debt. Current government net debt as a share of GDP (column 
5) indicates the potential for savings relative to the total debt burden when assets 
held by the government are subtracted.9 
With government net debt (calculated as gross debt net of intra-governmental 
debt, financial assets held by the government and debt held by the central bank) of 
9 Arguably, government gross debt to GDP is the more relevant measure for short- to medium- term debt sus-
tainability analysis. However, for our purposes, it is important to consider assets held by the government as 
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235around 90.1% in 2017, a fall in the real interest rates has had a substantial impact 
on public finances in Belgium.10 Net debt interest payments have decreased from 
about 7% of GDP in 1998 to the current level of around 2.3% (figure 3). 
Figure 3


















































Source: authors’ illustration based on data from OECD Economic Outlook 2015.
The maturity profile indicates that spikes mostly emerge in the short term, with 
16% of total government debt maturing in 2016 and slightly more than that in 
2017. After a third peak in 2021, the profile flattens out (European Commission, 
2016 and Bloomberg data). Major forecasts predict a decrease in interest rate 
expenditure between 0.5 percentage points of GDP (IMF, 2016c) and 0.3 percent-
age points of GDP (OECD, 2015) over the years 2018 and 2019. Our own calcula-
tions confirm these projections and extends them until 2030. To do so, we first 
utilise detailed data on Belgian government debt composition for all years until 
2030, including information on coupon payments and maturity dates for all lia-
bilities.11 Figure 4 (left hand side) below shows the weighted average fixed cou-
pons of non-treasury bill debt maturing by year (2016-30).12
We then calculate savings on government interest rate payments until 2030 based 
on a number of reasonable assumptions. First, we assume that debt composition, 
i.e. the shares issued in treasury bills, government bonds and other loans, remains 
constant.13 Second, we then assume that the government rolls over maturing sover-
eign bonds by issuing new bonds that pay coupons equal to the secondary market 
10 Note that net government debt is decreasing in most euro area countries due to the ECB’s sovereign bond 
purchasing program. In January 2017, the euro area national central banks held 14% of gross government debt 
in the euro area (with the exception of Greece, which is not eligible to participate in the program). 
11 Data was extracted from Bloomberg.
12 Since treasury bills have a maximum maturity of one year, we do not expect further gains accruing to them. 
We thus focus our estimates on all other bonds.
13 The Belgian government also entered into a number of forward rate agreements, typically using 3 month 
and 6 month Euribor as the floating rate. The resulting coupons are all very close to zero. We do not consider 
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236 yields of bonds with a maturity equivalent to the weighted average maturity of total 
government bonds14. Under the additional assumption that both real interest rates 
and inflation expectations remain constant over the relevant time horizon ewe can 
estimate expected savings on interest payments (figure 4, right hand side). 
Figure 4
Weighted average fixed coupon on Belgian non-treasury bill debt maturing in the 
indicated years 2016-2030 (left hand side) and savings on coupon payments as a 












































































Source: authors’ elaboration on Bloomberg and IMF WEO data.
The highest gains were thus realised in 2017 and are expected for 2022, with 
declining interest rate expenditure of 0.3% and 0.25% of GDP, respectively. A 
further peak occurs in 2028.
How much can the Belgian government possibly save? In order to determine the 
lower bound for net debt interest payments, consider the following thought exper-
iment: bonds of a maturity equalling slightly above eight years – the weighted 
average maturity of all outstanding debt – currently yield 0.37%. Multiplying this 
number by outstanding Belgian net debt to GDP of 90.1% gives us a lower bound 
for net debt interest payments of 0.33% of GDP.15 Of course, this extreme scenario 
is not likely to materialise in full due to other considerations affecting the optimal 
composition of total government debt. Accumulating the expected gains displayed 
in figure 3 and adjusting them downward to consider only interest payments on 
government net debt gives us an estimate for savings of about 1.1 percentage 
points of GDP until the end of 2030, taking 2015 as the base year (figure 5). This 
number increases to 1.6 percentage points of GDP if measured from 2013 (from 
which year we have age related expenditure projections, cf. below).16
14 This assumption is conservative for two reasons. First, we assume a linear and positively sloped yield curve. 
Figure A2 in the appendix shows that this assumption is reasonable – the “flattening outˮ of the yield curve 
for maturities >20 years only increases potential gains. Second, in reality, public debt management is not stat-
ic. Increased future growth expectations that would result in a steeper yield curve could easily be compensat-
ed for by issuing more short-term debt. 
15 Data on the Belgian net debt-to-GDP ratio were extracted from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.
16 To see this, add the 0.5 percentage point fall in figure 5 from 2013 to 2015 to the projected 1.1 percentage 
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237Figure 5
Historical and forecast aggregate savings on Belgian government net debt coupon 












2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Source: authors’ own calculations based on Bloomberg data.
An important question is how the savings (as a percent of GDP) on interest pay-
ments translate into an improvement of public finances. Since part of the windfall 
for the government in terms of lower interest payments represents a loss in interest 
income of the domestic population, it does have implications in terms of income 
and consumption taxes; government tax intake will be lower. In addition, there 
may be second-order general equilibrium effects. Because lower interest rates on 
debt are a global phenomenon, the extent to which the domestic population is 
exposed depends on the net international investment position of the country’s 
investors.17 As an example, foreigners hold around 50% of outstanding Belgian 
government debt (table 1 above). If the volume of foreign debt held by Belgians 
(which experienced a similar decline in interest rates) was at a value of less than 
50% of government gross debt, parts of the government savings on interest rate 
payments would be a windfall from abroad and would not affect the real domestic 
economy. If, on the other hand, Belgians held foreign bonds equivalent to a value 
greater than 50% of Belgian government gross debt, the global fall in interest rates 
would affect the domestic real economy to a relatively larger extent. 
Belgium’s net international investment position (NIIP) shows that the country is a 
net global investor with net assets valued at approximate 50% of GDP, a value that 
has remained relatively stable over the past few years. However, this surplus is 
composed of a large surplus in equity securities (€147 billion or 35% of GDP) and 
a surplus in residual investment, including financial derivatives (€112 billion or 
27% of GDP). The position in debt securities, on the other hand, shows a deficit of 
€66 billion (or -17% of GDP).18 Thus, the direct effect of a global decline in interest 
rates (and a rise in the equity premium) is likely to benefit Belgian investors. 
17 The relative riskiness of the investment portfolio (i.e. the composition in terms of equity and debt instru-
ments) across countries is also a factor. If Belgians are more likely to hold equity relative to other nationali-
ties, lower interest rates would affect their investment income comparatively less. 
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238 The overall impact that lower interest rates have on consumption via implicit 
transfers from bond holders to the government is arguably small. First, there is a 
limited direct effect on households. In the case of Belgium, residents outside the 
financial sectors held only a very small share (<5%) of outstanding Belgian gov-
ernment debt in 2018.19 Hence, the effect would come from lower dividends or 
equity valuations of banks and insurance companies, which only have a small 
effect on consumption (Case, Quigley and Shiller, 2005). Other holders of govern-
ment debt are pension funds and mutual funds invested in safe assets. The impact 
of their investment performance on household behaviour is arguably limited.
The persistently low interest rates further allowed Belgian public debt managers 
to strategically issue sovereign bonds and thereby flatten out the debt maturity 
profile despite the high debt-to-GDP ratio. While it is more difficult to quantify the 
positive value of such de-risking (and we can thus not directly account for it in our 
calculations), we nevertheless discuss the implications further in appendix II.
4.1  CAN DECREASED DEBT-SERVICING COSTS OFFSET INCREASED  
AGE-RELATED EXPENDITURE?
Combining information from the European Commission’s 2015 ageing report and 
the Belgium Federal Planning Bureau’s (2017) update on forecast pension expend-
iture allows us to display changes in age-related expenditure in Belgium from 
2013 to 2030 (and 2020) (figure 6).
Figure 6
Disaggregated changes in age-related expenditure in Belgium with base year 










Unemployment Education Long-term care Health care Gross public pensions
Source: authors’ illustration based on data from the European Commission and the Belgian 
Federal Planning Bureau.
Overall, age-related expenditure increases by 2.4 percentage points of GDP over 
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239(+2.0), long-term care (+0.5) and education (+0.2) are slightly counter-balanced 
by lower health care (-0.1) and decreased unemployment expenditure (-0.2).
Comparing these numbers to the projected savings on government net debt inter-
est payments of 1.6 percentage points of GDP from 2013 to 2030 shows that the 
latter offsets the former to a large extent. More precisely, savings on net debt inter-
est payments can cover roughly two thirds of age-related expenditure under the 
no-interest-rate change scenario measured from the baseline of 2013. In a hypo-
thetical scenario where secondary market yields on average maturity debt increase 
to 1.5% in 2020 (thus, by 113 basis points), savings on net debt interest payments 
would still cover 54% of the additional age-related expenditure (see appendix I).
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we review recent contributions to the debate on the drivers of real 
interest rates. We conclude that, while we are uncertain to what extent each secu-
lar driver contributed to the decline in real rates over the past two decades, there 
is no evidence that any of them could be reversed substantially in the near future. 
Thus, we expect real interest rates to remain low in the medium-term.
The following expected decrease in Belgium’s debt-servicing costs could offset 
the increase in age-related expenditure to a large extent. Even in a scenario of 
slowly increasing interest rates, the direct gains accruing to Belgian public 
finances from persistently low interest rates cover a substantial share of age-
related financing needs until 2030, thus minimizing the need for further adjust-
ments to Belgium’s primary balance if these savings are channelled towards pub-
lic pensions, long-term care and education. Similar mechanisms would apply to 
other highly indebted countries.
Indirect gains stem from an extension of debt maturities (see appendix II) and a 
decrease of Belgian government debt in real terms, with potential long-term ben-
efits for sovereign debt sustainability. 
We note that our findings are relevant to the medium-term only. Despite the pen-
sion reform in Belgium, age-related expenditure will continue to increase in Bel-
gium until 2069 (Belgium Federal Planning Bureau, 2017) and the dampening 
effect from the low interest rate environment will soon reach its peak. This finding 
thus closely relates to a recent contribution by Elmendorf and Sheiner (2017) who 
argue that the combination of an aging society and low interest rates changes the 
government’s optimal spending path: while spending adjustments to cover future 
liabilities should be enacted as soon as possible (and thus give relevant actors time 
to adjust), they should not be implemented now. The low interest environment can 
thus be seen as a tool to buy time, but not to abandon inevitable structural reforms.
Disclosure statement 




















































































































































Belgian secondary market government bond yields (07/05/2017) and Belgian 
































































































































Note: all government issued bonds are currently below the Belgian CPI inflation rate (figure 
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241Figure a3
Overall change in age-related expenditure by 2020 and 2030 in Belgium (base 









Source: authors’ illustration based on data from the European Commission and Belgian FPB.
Figure a4
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Note: based on a hypothetical scenario that assumes an increase in the average yield of maturi-
ty debt in the secondary market from the current level to 1.5% in 2020.
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242 APPENDIX II
BELGIUM’S GOVERNMENT DEBT MATURITY PROFILE
The low interest environment led to a shift in Belgium’s government debt maturity 
profile. The weighted average maturity of total outstanding government debt 
increased by 3.5 years between January 2010 and March 2017, allowing the Bel-
gian government to de-risk its debt structure without paying a high default risk 
premium (figure A5).20 
Figure a5





































































































An extension of maturities is a difficult yet important task. Heavily indebted coun-
tries like Belgium usually have maturity profiles skewed to the short term as gov-
ernments’ commitments to low inflation become less credible when debt is high 
(Blanchard and Missale, 1991). While the credibility argument only applies to a 
very limited extent in a monetary union, several authors emphasise a second rea-
son.21 Default risk alone may explain the short-term nature of debt maturity pro-
files when governments have accumulated significant debt in the past (Alesina et 
al., 1992). 
The more debt a government takes on, the higher the default risk premium that 
investors demand on long-term debt. Rolling over large amounts of debt every 
year entails a high vulnerability to sudden rises in interest rates, rendering default 
exponentially more likely with every year. This motivates governments to take on 
20 As pointed out by Gros (2016), purchasing domestic government bonds by national central banks effecti-
vely decreases their maturity to 0. As of 31 March 2017, the National Bank of Belgium held Belgian govern-
ment debt worth €49 billion (11% of outstanding debt) with a weighted average maturity of 10.1 years within 
the ECB’s public sector purchase program (PSPP). This effectively reduces the weighted average maturity of 
government debt still traded on the secondary market to 8.7 years and the weighted average maturity of total 
outstanding debt to 7.9 years, which still constitutes a large increase over the past years. 



































































43 (3) 225-246 (2019)
243high amounts of short-term debt, which exacerbates the issue rather than solving 
it. Escaping from such a bad equilibrium can generally only be accomplished by 
a significant reduction in the debt burden. Belgium and other heavily indebted 
advanced countries, however, seem to have managed a reduction of their short-
term debt owing to the current low-interest environment.
In general, lengthening and thus smoothing the structure of government debt by 
avoiding maturity peaks makes confidence crises among investors less likely. If 
the amount of debt maturing every year is small, even severe crises characterised 
by a rapid rise in sovereign bond yields would not put pressure on public finances. 
As these dynamics are typically priced in by financial market participants, the 
magnitude of a sovereign bond price decline will eventually be less severe.
All in all, the government of Belgium has thus benefitted substantially from the 
global decline in interest rates. Besides the immediately favourable effect on debt-
servicing costs, Belgium’s government debt is currently decreasing in real terms 
and its maturity profile has become less risky. The direct gains from the latter two 
effects are difficult to quantify. The most significant indirect effect is the positive 
impact on Belgium’s credit rating as the above factors are taken into consideration 
by all major credit rating agencies. As stated in the introduction, we abstain from 
speculating on potential private sector losses that may eventually inflict costs on 
the public sector. Contrasting the increased financial market risk caused by the 
low interest rate environment with the gains on decreased government interest 
payments would be another useful exercise. Further analysis of the case of Bel-
gium should also consider the impact on pension funds and the “search-for-yield” 
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